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FEATURE COMMENT: Section 809 And 
‘e-Portal’ Proposals, By Cutting Bid 
Protests In Federal Procurement, Could 
Breach International Agreements And 
Raise New Risks Of Corruption
Bid protests—vendors’ challenges to contracting 
officials’ errors, either before or after award—have 
been an established part of federal procurement 
for at least a century. Protests (sometimes called 
“challenges” or “remedies proceedings” abroad) are 
a recognized bulwark against corruption in the U.S., 
and have become a standard part of procurement 
systems around the world, often at the urging of 
the U.S. 
But new proposals being considered for U.S. 
Government procurement in practice could dramat-
ically limit bid protests in the name of streamlining 
the procurement process. This drastic change to U.S. 
procurement practices could violate international 
agreements under which the U.S. has agreed to 
maintain an effective bid protest system, and could 
raise new risks of corruption in procurement. 
Bid Protests: Part of U.S. Procurement for 
Nearly a Century—Bid protests have been part 
of federal procurement since at least 1926, when 
what is now the Government Accountability Office 
sustained a vendor’s challenge to overly restrictive 
specifications for the procurement of trucks. See 
Gordon, “Annals of Accountability: The First Pub-
lished Bid Protest Decision,” 39 ProCuremenT Law. 
11 (2004). By the 1970s, the federal courts had be-
come established alternative channels for protests. 
Early bid protests were brought in federal district 
court under the Administrative Procedure Act, but 
modern bid protests are brought under a statute 
that specifically allows the U.S. Court of Federal 
Claims to review procurement decisions, 28 USCA 
§ 1491(b). See Cibinic, Jr., Nash, Jr. and Yukins,
Formation of Government Contracts, 1673–74 (4th 
ed. 2011). 
GAO currently handles roughly 2,500 protests 
every year, see “GAO Bid Protest Annual Report to 
the Congress for Fiscal Year 2017” (GAO-18-237SP), 
available at www.gao.gov/assets/690/688362.pdf, 
and the COFC hears about 100 protests annually, 
see, e.g., COFC, “Statistical Report for the Fiscal 
Year October 1, 2016–September 30, 2017,” avail-
able at www.uscfc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/
FY17 stats for website.pdf. (Although protests may 
be brought directly to the contracting agency as 
well, per Federal Acquisition Regulation 33.103, 
these “agency-level” protests are commonly viewed 
as ineffective and are seldom used in practice.)
There are generally two kinds of federal pro-
tests: pre-award protests, and postaward protests 
asserting that agency officials made an error in the 
award of a contract. See generally Cibinic et al., su-
pra, at 1673–74. Pre-award protests allow vendors 
to challenge, for example, terms in a solicitation 
that are overly restrictive and thus unreasonably 
anticompetitive. Pre-award protests are an impor-
tant tool in international trade because they allow 
foreign vendors (including U.S. vendors competing 
abroad) to challenge unfair and anticompetitive re-
quirements. Protests after award are equally impor-
tant: They allow disappointed bidders to complain 
of errors in the process and to point out corruption 
that may have infected the procurement.
Bid Protests Have Been Adopted Nation-
ally and Internationally—Because of the im-
portant protections they provide against error and 
corruption, bid protests have been adopted across 
the U.S., and indeed around the world. See, e.g., 
Gordon, “Constructing a Bid Protest Process: The 
Choices that Every Procurement Challenge System 
Must Make,” 35 Pub. Cont. L.J. 427 (2006); Conway, 
“State and Local Procurement Law,” ch. 9 (ABA 
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2012) (reviewing state and local protest systems). 
The European Union requires its member states to 
maintain effective bid challenge systems, see EU 
Remedies Directive 89/665/EEC, and Directive 92/13/
EEC, as amended through Directive 2007/66/EC, and 
the United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law (UNCITRAL) model procurement law, in 
chapter VIII, calls for bid protest systems.
A key international instrument that recog-
nizes bid protests’ role in fighting corruption is the 
United Nations Convention Against Corruption. It 
has been adopted by the vast majority of nations, 
including the U.S.—which played a leading role in 
developing the Convention. See UN Office of Drugs 
and Crime (UNODC), “United Nations Convention 
Against Corruption Signature & Ratification Sta-
tus as of 3 October 2017,” available at www.unodc.
org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/signatories.html. The 
Convention’s Article 9 was written to call specifi-
cally for effective bid protest systems as a means 
of discouraging corruption in procurement. See, 
e.g., UNODC, “Good Practices in Ensuring Compli-
ance with Article 9 of the United Nations Conven-
tion Against Corruption” 23–24 (2013); UNODC, 
“Travaux Preparatoires of the Negotiations for 
the Elaboration of the United Nations Convention 
Against Corruption” (2010), available at www.uno-
dc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/Publications/
Travaux/Travaux_Preparatoires_-_UNCAC_E.pdf. 
U.S. Trade Agreements Call for Bid Protest 
Protections: As noted, bid protests are also an im-
portant part of international trade agreements be-
cause they give vendors competing in international 
procurement markets a means of challenging unfair 
barriers to competition. Following in part the exam-
ple of the U.S., the leading international agreement 
on opening procurement markets, the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) Agreement on Government 
Procurement (GPA), includes provisions requiring 
bid protest systems in member states. See WTO, 
Revised Agreement on Government Procurement, 
Art. XVIII, April 2, 2012, available at www.wto.org/
english/docs_e/legal_e/rev-gpr-94_01_e.pdf. Those 
bid protest systems mandated by the GPA give 
“suppliers believing that a procurement has been 
handled inconsistently with the requirements of the 
GPA a right of recourse to an independent domestic 
tribunal.” WTO, “Overview of the Agreement on 
Government Procurement,” available at www.wto.
org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/gpa_overview_e.htm. 
The U.S. has also agreed to include bid protest 
measures in many other international agreements, 
particularly in free trade agreements (FTAs) that open 
procurement markets internationally for U.S. exporters. 
See Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Free Trade 
Agreements, available at ustr.gov/trade-agreements/
free-trade-agreements (links to FTAs); U.S.-Australia 
FTA, Art. 15.11(2) (“Each Party shall maintain at least 
one impartial administrative or judicial authority that 
is independent of its procuring entities to receive and 
review challenges that suppliers submit, in accordance 
with the Party’s law, relating to a covered procure-
ment.”); U.S.-Bahrain FTA, Art. 9.11(1) (“Each Party 
shall provide timely, effective, transparent, and predict-
able means for a supplier to challenge the conduct of a 
covered procurement ....”); U.S.-Dominican Republic-
Central America FTA (CAFTA-DR), Art. 9.15(1) (“Each 
Party shall establish or designate at least one impar-
tial administrative or judicial Authority ... to receive 
and review challenges that suppliers submit relating 
to the obligations of the Party and its entities under 
this Chapter ....”); U.S.-Chile FTA, Art. 9.13(1) (“Each 
Party shall establish or designate at least one impar-
tial administrative or judicial authority ... to receive 
and review challenges that suppliers submit relating 
to the Party’s measures implementing this Chapter in 
connection with a procurement covered by this Chapter 
....”); U.S.-Colombia FTA, Art. 9.11(1) (“Each Party shall 
establish or designate at least one impartial administra-
tive or judicial authority that is independent from its 
procuring entities to receive and review challenges that 
suppliers submit relating to the application by a pro-
curing entity of a Party’s measures implementing this 
Chapter ....”); U.S.-Korea FTA, Art. 17.3 (incorporating 
by reference GPA challenge provisions); U.S.-Morocco 
FTA, Art. 9.12(1) (“Each Party shall permit a supplier 
to challenge a Party’s compliance with its measures 
implementing this Chapter ....”); North American Free 
Trade Agreement, Art. 1017 (“In order to promote fair, 
open and impartial procurement procedures, each Party 
shall adopt and maintain bid challenge procedures for 
procurement covered by this Chapter in accordance with 
the following ... (a) each Party shall allow suppliers to 
submit bid challenges concerning any aspect of the pro-
curement process, which for the purposes of this Article 
begins after an entity has decided on its procurement 
requirement and continues through the contract award 
....”); U.S.-Oman FTA, Art. 9.11(1) (“Each Party shall 
provide timely, effective, transparent, and predictable 
means for a supplier to challenge the conduct of a cov-
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ered procurement ....”); U.S.-Panama FTA, Art. 9.15(1) 
(same as U.S.-CAFTA FTA); U.S.-Peru FTA, Art. 9.11(1) 
(same as U.S.-Colombia FTA); U.S.-Singapore FTA, Art. 
13.3(1) (incorporating by reference GPA provisions).
Reciprocal Defense Procurement Agreements Call 
for Bid Protest Protections: Provisions guaranteeing a 
right of access to bid protests have also been included 
in the U.S.’ many reciprocal defense procurement 
agreements with its allies. See www.acq.osd.mil/
dpap/cpic/ic/reciprocal_procurement_memoran-
da_of_understanding.html (U.S. reciprocal defense 
procurement agreements). Defense FAR Supplement 
225.003 (listing qualifying countries); DFARS Subpt. 
225.8 (implementing provisions). 
To ensure open markets, reciprocal defense 
procurement agreements guarantee, for example, 
that both parties “will have and maintain published 
procedures regarding the filing and review of com-
plaints arising in connection with any phase of the 
procurement process,” to ensure that “foreign sup-
pliers shall be treated the same as domestic suppli-
ers.” “Memorandum of Understanding Between the 
Federal Minister of Defense of the Federal Republic 
of Germany and the Secretary of Defense of the 
United States of America Concerning the Principles 
Governing Mutual Cooperation in the Research 
and Development, Production, Procurement and 
Logistic Support of Defense Equipment,” annex 7 
§ 6, Oct. 17, 1978, available at www.acq.osd.mil/
dpap/Docs/mou-germany.pdf; see also “Memoran-
dum of Understanding Between the Government of 
the United States of America and the Government 
of the French Republic Concerning the Principles 
Governing Reciprocal Purchases of Defense Equip-
ment,” annex iv, art. 6, May 22, 1978 (parties commit 
to maintaining complaints procedures), available 
at www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/Docs/mou-france.pdf; 
“Memorandum of Understanding Between the De-
partment of Defense of the United States of America 
and the Ministry of Defense of Japan Concerning 
Reciprocal Defense Procurement,” § 5, ¶ 6, June 
4, 2016 (parties commit to maintaining complaint 
procedures regarding any phase of defense procure-
ment), available at www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/Docs/
EON for Japan. EON for US. US Japan RDP MOU 
1.pdf; “Memorandum of Understanding Between the 
Government of Australia and the Government of the 
United States Concerning Reciprocal Defense Pro-
curement,” art. 5 § 6, April 19, 1995 (complaints pro-
cedures should ensure equitable consideration), avail-
able at www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/Docs/mou-australia.
pdf; “Memorandum of Understanding Between the 
Government of the United States of America and the 
Government of the Kingdom of Sweden Relating to 
the Principles Governing Mutual Cooperation In the 
Defense Procurement Area,” annex 1, art. III § 5, June 
11, 1987 (calling for hearing procedures to review 
complaints at any phase of procurement), available 
at www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/Docs/mou-sweden.pdf; 
“Memorandum of Understanding Between the De-
partment of Defense of the United States of America 
and the Secretary of State for Defence of the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
Concerning Reciprocal Defense Procurement,” § 5, ¶ 
5, Dec. 22, 2017 (each party commits to maintaining 
complaints procedures), available at www.acq.osd.
mil/dpap/Docs/paic/US-UK RDP MOU signed 22 
Dec 2017 USA003826-17.pdf.
Through the reciprocal defense procurement 
agreements, the U.S. and its military allies have 
agreed to allow protesting vendors—who serve, in 
essence, as “whistleblowers” regarding unfair Govern-
ment actions—to enforce these broad agreements to 
open defense markets. These agreements go beyond 
mere trade arrangements and are intended to fa-
cilitate cooperation and interoperability among al-
lies. See, e.g., Miller, “Is It Time to Reform Reciprocal 
Defense Procurement Agreements?,” 39 Pub. Cont. 
L.J. 93, 94 (2009). Vendors’ bid protests are, in this 
light, part of a comprehensive security strategy by the 
U.S. and its allies, because they promote contractor 
participation in integrated defense procurements of 
military allies. 
Recognizing the broader benefits of bid protests, 
both in opening trade and in discouraging corruption, 
various international organizations have embraced 
bid protests in recent years. See, e.g., Anderson and 
Müller, “The Revised WTO Agreement on Govern-
ment Procurement (GPA): Key Design Features and 
Significance for Global Trade and Development,” 48 
Geo. J. Int’l L. 949, 993 (2018) (noting importance 
of bid protest systems in checking corruption in-
ternationally). For example, when the World Bank 
recently revamped the procurement framework used 
for its borrower nations, it expanded its procurement-
related complaint procedures—an informal sort of bid 
challenge—through which vendors may bring irregu-
larities and corruption to the Bank’s attention. See, 
e.g., World Bank, “World Bank Procurement Regula-
tions for IPF Borrowers,” ¶¶ 3.26–3.31 and Annex 
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III (rev. 2017), available at policies.worldbank.org/
sites/ppf3/PPFDocuments/7ab37ad5cb6e4f4c9c075
55d23cc0c42.pdf; World Bank, “Procurement-Related 
Complaints” (2017), available at pubdocs.worldbank.
org/en/975671478891365829/Complaints-Guidance-
FINAL-Revised.pdf. These types of reforms, often 
inspired or encouraged by the U.S. and its business 
community, reflect an accelerating international con-
sensus in favor of bid protest regimes.
Pending Proposals Could Curtail Bid Pro-
tests—Despite the growing international support 
for bid protests, and despite the U.S.’ central role in 
fostering bid protests worldwide, two pending policy 
proposals could dramatically reduce the scope of bid 
protests available in U.S. federal procurement. The 
first, per § 846 of the National Defense Authorization 
Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2018, P.L. 115-91, would 
launch a pilot program to allow federal officials to 
buy directly from electronic portals. This initiative 
could—depending on its implementation—allow pro-
curements to bypass the normal public solicitation 
process, and foreclose pre-award protests. The second 
set of proposals, from the Section 809 blue-ribbon 
panel assessing defense procurement reforms, might 
radically streamline off-the-shelf purchasing, which 
again could make pre-award protests practically 
impossible.
Section 846 e-Commerce Portals: Section 846 of the 
FY 2018 NDAA proposes to allow federal purchasing 
under the simplified acquisition threshold to be con-
ducted through commercial e-commerce portals. This 
initiative could (depending on how it is implemented) 
curtail pre-award bid protests if it permits federal pur-
chasers to bypass the normal pre-award publication on 
which most pre-award protests are based. 
In § 846, Congress tasked the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget and the General Services Admin-
istration with studying how federal agencies could 
purchase from commercially available e-commerce 
portals. See, e.g., H. Rep. No. 5-4, 115th Cong., 1st 
Sess. (Nov. 9, 2017) (conference report). Per Con-
gress’ mandate, OMB and GSA March 16 published 
an initial report suggesting three possible models 
for implementing § 846: an “e-commerce” model, 
under which vendors sell products electronically; 
an “e-marketplace” model, through which federal 
buyers could access goods and services through 
a commercial online marketplace; and an “e-pro-
curement” model, in which a buying organization 
would purchase electronic marketplace services 
and use those services, in turn, to buy from con-
tracted vendors. See GSA, “Procurement Through 
Commercial e-Commerce Portals: Implementation 
Plan” at 6 (2018), available at interact.gsa.gov/
sites/default/files/Commercial%20Platform%20
Implementation%20Plan.pdf; GSA, “GSA and OMB 
Finalize Joint Implementation Plan for Commercial 
e-Commerce Portal Program” (March 16, 2018), 
available at www.gsa.gov/about-us/newsroom/
news-releases/gsa-and-omb-finalize-joint-imple-
mentation-plan-for-commercial-ecommerce-portal-
program. 
If the § 846 initiative results in direct pur-
chases from electronic portals (thus in practice 
exempting an entire phase of procurement from 
protest), these changes would make it easier for 
officials to indulge in pre-award discrimination 
and could pose serious questions under the trade 
agreements discussed above. Plurilateral, regional 
and bilateral trade agreements typically require 
(as noted) that vendors be allowed to protest any 
“covered” procurement, such as any supply acqui-
sitions over (approximately) $200,000; electronic 
portals implemented under § 846 could breach that 
promise by making pre-award protests impossible. 
The reciprocal defense agreements discussed 
above similarly guarantee that protests will be avail-
able for “any phase” of a defense procurement; that 
guarantee could be breached if large numbers of on-
line purchases by the Department of Defense were, in 
practice, exempt from bid protest. The agencies tasked 
with implementing § 846, GSA and OMB, seemed to 
recognize these trade concerns in their initial report, 
which cited potential issues regarding “[e]xisting 
trade laws and treaties relevant to implementing 
commercial e-commerce.” “Implementation Plan,” 
supra, at 8. 
If the U.S. Government, in implementing § 846, 
chooses to allow rapid direct purchases through 
a commercial portal, that radical change in pro-
curement processes—which traditionally call for 
public notice before award—could make pre-award 
protests impossible, or nearly so. This would have 
profound implications under international agree-
ments, as this article discusses, and it also could 
affect other initiatives, such as socioeconomic 
and sustainability requirements, which rely on a 
transparent, accountable notice process to ensure 
that ancillary Government goals are met in any 
given procurement. See, e.g., GSA, Procurement 
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Through Commercial e-Commerce Portals: Public 
Meeting (Jan. 9, 2018), transcript at 54 (discuss-
ing need to meet socioeconomic requirements in 
portals); 71–74 (unresolved issues regarding alloca-
tions of risk and responsibilities); 79–85 (concerns 
raised regarding domestic preferences and treaty 
compliance, and accountability through bid pro-
tests); 90–91 (concerns regarding compliance with 
socioeconomic requirements); 102–103 (open Trade 
Agreements Act (TAA) compliance issues); 130–31, 
216–17 (special statutory obligations must be met, 
such as the TAA, which bars purchases from China 
and other countries not members of trade agree-
ments); 226–27 (statutory requirements should not 
be bypassed by portals), available at interact.gsa.
gov/sites/default/files/Transcript%20Comml%20
Portal%20Public%20Meeting%20%281092018%29.
pdf. Allowing officials to purchase directly through 
electronic portals, bypassing public notice of the 
pending procurement, thus has implications that 
may carry far beyond the international agreements 
that are our focus here. 
Section 809 Panel Proposals: The second, paral-
lel group of proposals, which may well be integrated 
with the first, has been put forward by the Section 809 
panel, a blue-ribbon commission which was tasked by 
Congress, through § 809 of the FY 2016 NDAA, P.L. 
114-92, to propose reforms to defense procurement 
rules. See, e.g., 60 GC ¶ 46. 
The panel’s work is proceeding in phases. In 
volume one of the panel’s report, published on 
January 31, the panel suggested that officials be 
allowed to procure commercially available goods 
and services—of any value—in a streamlined man-
ner. “Report of the Advisory Panel on Streamlining 
and Codifying Acquisition Regulations (Section 809 
Panel),” Vol. 1, at 9–10 (Jan. 2018), available at sec-
tion809panel.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/
Sec809Panel_Vol1-Report_Jan18_FINAL.pdf. 
In practice, this may mean eliminating pre-award 
protests for such commercial items, which (the Sec-
tion 809 panel reports) represented 18 percent of 
DOD purchases by dollar value in FY 2017. Id. at 17. 
The panel’s parallel recommendation that bid protests 
be largely eliminated for Small Business Innovation 
Research program awards, see id. at 193, suggests 
that the panel is quite serious in contemplating new 
restrictions on bid protests, as part of its broader 
recommendations to streamline the procurement 
process.
Notably, the policy reasons put forward by the 
panel for limiting bid protests—concerns about dis-
ruptive bid protests brought by contractors strategi-
cally seeking information, see id. at 10, were largely 
rebutted by a RAND Corp. report, which was also 
called for by Congress. RAND found that defense 
awards are seldom protested, that the process is 
structured to minimize protests’ disruption, and 
that major contractors are unlikely to use protests 
as strategic tools. See Arena et al., RAND Corp., “As-
sessing Bid Protests of U.S. Department of Defense 
Procurements: Identifying Issues, Trends, and Driv-
ers,” xi–xviii (2018), available at www.rand.org/
pubs/research_reports/RR2356.html; Stanley, “More 
Than Half Of GAO Protests Resolved In Under 30 
Days,” Law360 (April 13, 2018) (public presenta-
tion by RAND researcher and senior GAO officials), 
available at www.law360.com/articles/1033506/
more-than-half-of-gao-protests-resolved-in-under-
30-days; “RAND Study Finds More DOD Protests, 
But No Flood Of Frivolous Protests,” 60 GC ¶ 18. The 
Section 809 panel’s concern that contractors bring 
protests merely to understand awards they have lost 
was also addressed, at least in part, by § 813 of the 
FY 2018 NDAA, which calls for agencies to make 
more detailed disclosures when they debrief offerors 
on major awards.
Conclusion—As a practical matter, if either 
initiative—the “electronic portals” initiative under § 
846, or the Section 809 panel proposals—ultimately 
means that federal officials will be allowed to pur-
chase commercially available goods and services 
directly from commercial electronic marketplaces 
without the prior publication normally required by 
FAR pt. 5, that streamlined procedure could exempt 
billions of procurement dollars from accountability 
in the bid protest process. That, in turn, could have 
serious consequences, only some of which are fully 
foreseeable.
For the reasons outlined above, sharply reducing 
bid protests could prove harmful. Whether through 
the “electronic portals” contemplated by § 846 or 
through the Section 809 panel’s proposed reforms, 
exempting billions of dollars of procurement from 
pre-award protests would run counter to a tradition 
of accountability in federal procurement, and could 
raise new risks of corruption in federal procurement. 
Efforts to curb bid protests could run afoul of the 
international agreements discussed above, both the 
FTAs (including the GPA) and the reciprocal defense 
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procurement agreements with U.S. allies. Trading 
partners might demand that their agreements with 
the U.S. be rolled back to shield portions of their own 
civilian and defense markets from protests, at least by 
U.S. vendors; those changes could hurt U.S. exporters 
facing unfair trade practices abroad, and open new 
risks of corruption in foreign markets. More specifi-
cally, reopening negotiations on the reciprocal defense 
procurement agreements to exempt certain defense 
procurements from protest could have national secu-
rity implications if foreign allies insisted on reducing 
other forms of cooperation to offset reduced bid pro-
test protections. The U.S. business community could 
be further damaged if developing nations, taking their 
cue from the U.S., exempted major portions of their 
growing procurement markets from bid protests. 
Finally, and least predictably, frustrated vendors 
seeking to challenge errors or corruption in procure-
ment might seek out other forms of legal relief, such 
as investor-state disputes under bilateral investment 
treaties which broadly guarantee foreign investors 
equitable treatment. See, e.g., Transparency Interna-
tional, “Anti-Corruption and Transparency Provisions 
in Trade Agreements” 11–12 (2017) (surveying litera-
ture on potential investor-state disputes regarding 
procurement under bilateral investment treaties), 
available at www.transparency.org/whatwedo/an-
swer/anti_corruption_and_transparency_provisions_
in_trade_agreements. By streamlining procurement to 
erase pre-award protests, the proposed reforms could 
launch new and disruptive forms of legal challenges.
 Proposals to streamline procurement by elimi-
nating steps of the traditional procurement process 
are not new; they arose, for example, when the Fed-
eral Government first considered allowing officials 
to buy using purchase cards, and more broadly when 
FAR pt. 13 was rewritten to permit more flexible 
procedures for relatively small procurements. As the 
waves of prior reform have shown, however, because 
traditional protections have evolved organically over 
time, their benefits are often not understood and the 
costs of dismantling them can be unforeseen and 
severe. Before the Government moves forward with 
proposals that would reduce bid protests, careful con-
sideration should be given to the potentially serious 
costs of abandoning the protections afforded by pro-
tests—protections which have evolved over nearly a 
century, and which are now a central and guaranteed 
part of procurement systems, here and abroad. 
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